Why do firms borrow on a short-term basis ? Evidence from European countries by Valérie Oheix & Dorothée Rivaud-Danset
Why do firms borrow on a short-term basis?
Evidence from European countries
Université Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense 
 (bâtiments K et G)
200, Avenue de la République
92001 NANTERRE CEDEX
Tél et Fax : 33.(0)1.40.97.59.07
Email : secretariat-economix@u-paris10.fr
Document de Travail 
Working Paper
2009-14
Valérie Oheix et Dorothée Rivaud-Danset
EconomiX
Université Paris X Nanterre
http://economix.u-paris10.fr/
UMR 7166 CNRS  1 
Why do firms borrow on a short-term basis?  












                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Pierre Blanchard, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Claude Mathieu, Patrick Sevestre and 
to participants at the 24
th Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance 2007 and at the seminars of EconomiX 
and the ERUDITE for useful comments and suggestions. 
† EconomiX, Université Paris Ouest – Nanterre La Défense and CNRS, Bâtiment G, 200 avenue de la 
République, 92001 Nanterre Cedex, France (e-mail: valerie.oheix@u-paris10.fr). 
‡ ERUDITE, Université Paris XII, Val de Marne, France (e-mail: rivaud-danset@univ-paris12.fr). 
   2 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates empirically the use of short-term bank loans by firms. We face two 
analytical frameworks. According to the corporate finance theory, short-term and long-term 
debts  are  substitutes,  while  in  the  credit  channel  literature  they  are  distinct  and 
complementary vehicles. We estimate a model that explains the level of short-term bank debt, 
using  panel  data  from  the  BACH  database  for  six  European  countries  (1989-2003).  Our 
results indicate that the two types of bank loans are complements. They show that short-term 





Ce  papier  examine  empiriquement  l‟utilisation  de  crédits  bancaires  à  court  terme  par  les 
entreprises.  Nous  confrontons  deux  cadres  analytiques.  Selon  la  théorie  de  la  finance 
d'entreprise, les dettes à court terme et à long terme sont des substituts, tandis que dans la 
littérature sur le canal du crédit elles sont des instruments distincts et complémentaires. Nous 
estimons un modèle qui explique le niveau de dette bancaire à court terme, en utilisant des 
données de panel de la base de données BACH pour six pays européens (1989-2003). Nos 
résultats indiquent que les deux types de prêts bancaires sont des compléments. Ils montrent 
que la dette bancaire de court terme devrait être analysée comme un instrument spécifique de 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Firms‟ debt maturity is an issue in two different strands of the literature that largely ignore 
each other. On the one hand, the corporate finance literature has typically viewed the debt 
maturity issue from the perspective of firms that choose the optimal debt ratio. Short-term and 
long-term  debts  are  analysed  as  substitutes  driven  by  investment  policy.  Due  to  costs  of 
agency or informational problems, firms and investors may prefer shorter maturity (Myers 
(1977), Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991)). 
On the other hand, the literature on the transmission channels of monetary policy has 
come to deal with the debt maturity issue in order to assess the existence of a credit channel. 
When  monetary  policy  is  involved,  it  is  the  financing  of  current  business  which  matters 
because of its  role in  downturns,  and short-term  debt  is  associated with  the financing of 
current business. Due to credit and financial market imperfections, liquidity flows to large 
enterprises at the early stages of downturns and, in the case of small firms, the amount of 
short-term  debt  is  reduced  during  tight  money  periods  (Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1994). 
Following the bank lending channel and the flight to quality hypothesis, banks do not prefer 
short-term loans. 
We aim to confront these two distinct analytical frameworks: the corporate finance and 
the monetary policy channels. The theory on corporate debt maturity structure focuses on the 
financing of investment; short-term and long-term debts are substitutes, short-term debt being 
a vehicle used to finance any kind of assets, and debt maturity is a matter of optimal choice. 
In the literature on the credit channel, the subject of short-term finance is the (mis)matching 
of  cash  inflows  and  outflows  during  operating  activities;  short-  and  long-term  debts  are 
distinct vehicles that may be complementary, and this view does not put forward an optimal 
maturity for new debt issues.  
We estimate a model that explains the short-term debt rate, defined as the rate of short-
term  bank  loans  to  total  assets,  using  panel  data  from  the  BACH  database  of  corporate 
accounts for six Continental European countries in the period 1989-2003. Our results indicate 
that the two sources of bank debt are complements rather than substitutes. Our findings allow 
us to conclude that corporate short-term bank debt should be better analysed as a specific 
vehicle that finances current assets and can be influenced by banks‟ own constraints, in line 
with the literature on monetary transmission mechanisms, than as a vehicle used to finance 
any kind of assets, in line with the corporate finance literature.   4 
The  organisation  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  recalls  that  the  corporate  debt 
maturity literature considers that short- and long-term debts are substitutes. The literature on 
the credit channel of monetary transmission raises doubts on the hypothesis of substitution. 
Section 3 sets out the model which investigates the ratio of short-term debt by firms in order 
to determine if it is better analysed by the corporate finance view or by the credit channel 
view. Section 4 presents the data set. Section 5 deals with estimation methods and displays the 
estimated results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II.  What do we learn from the literature on the demand and supply of 
short-term debt? 
 
What do we learn from the literature on debt maturity issue in corporate finance? 
The  theoretical  literature  on  the  maturity  of  corporate  debt  issues  deals  with  the  optimal 
investment policy. Some firms prefer borrowing on a short-term basis as a way of reducing 
agency conflicts and/or asymmetry of information effects. 
The scope of this research is largely inspired by Myers‟s (1977) question: why do firms 
borrow short-term to finance long-term projects? His answer is based on the agency cost 
hypothesis,  also  called  the  contracting-cost  hypothesis.  Managers  acting  on  behalf  of 
equityholders may fail to exercise profitable investment options. They will not realise projects 
with positive net value when debt captures an excessive portion of equityholders‟ benefit
1. 
The conflict between debtholders who capture the benefit and managers may have negative 
consequences  for  firms  with  a  large  set  of  growth  opportunities.  Myers  considers  that 
shortening the debt maturity structure or, to be more accurate, “a policy of rolling over short 
maturity debt claims” gives flexibility and, therefore, is one way of preventing firms with 
more growth opportunities from adopting suboptimal investment policies
2. Firms with more 
growth opportunities and, as a consequence, more potential agency conflicts should prefer 
shorter maturity in order to become less dependent on monitors.  
                                                 
1Outstanding debt may change the firm‟s investment decision only when the debt matures after the firm‟s 
investment option expires. From the shareholders‟ viewpoint, the option is worth exercising only if the value of 
the newly acquired asset in a revealed state of nature (Vs) exceeds the sum of the required outlay (I) and the 
promised payment to the firm‟s creditors (P) (Myers, 1977, p. 153). If V(s) – I < P, although V(s) – I > 0, the 
option is not exercised.  
2“Borrowing short does not, in itself, reduce monitoring cost. What it does offer is the setting for continuous 
renegotiation, in which the firm can in principle shift at any time back to all-equity financing or to another 
source of debt capital. This seems to be a good solution, but there are costs of maintaining such a continuous, 
intimate and flexible relationship” (Myers, 1977, p. 159).   5 
Informational  asymmetry  causes  firms  that  are  less  likely  than  other  firms  to  have 
problems rolling over their debt to borrow on short-term basis. In Flannery‟s model (1986), 
firms  with  favourable  private  information  about  future  prospects  balance  between  the 
advantages of sending a signal of quality, if they choose a short maturity, and the expected 
costs in rolling over short-term debt, due to transaction costs and higher interest rates if they 
are downgraded. In Diamond‟s model (1991), firms with a sufficiently good credit rating 
balance between the advantages of being refinanced at lower cost when good news arrive and 
the risk that sound projects may not be refinanced, both being associated with the use of short-
term  debt.  Flannery‟s  model  predicts  a  positive  correlation  between  debt  maturity  and 
underlying asset risk. In Diamond‟s model debt maturity is a nonmonotonic function of the 
risk rating because low rated firms have no choice but to borrow on a short-term basis so that 
issuing  longer  term  debt  is  preferred  only  by  firms  with  a  medium  rating.  Shortening 
maturities increases the sensitivity of the financing cost to new information. This type of 
“bridge financing” allows investors to refinance at higher (lower) cost in times of bad (good) 
news and, even, to refuse to refinance.  
To sum up, in the corporate finance literature, greater information asymmetries and/or 
agency conflicts are associated with shorter maturity by both parties. Firms with more growth 
opportunities and/or lower risk than other firms should prefer shorter maturity.  
 
Are banks’ and bondholders’ preferences similar? 
In the theoretical models and most of the empirical literature, the firm borrows from the 
market and not from the bank, although the implications of the models are supposed to be the 
same in both contexts. However, why should banks‟ and bondholders‟ behaviours be similar? 
Among the empirical research on corporate debt maturity, one study allows a discussion of 
the generally accepted assumption that bondholders and banks preferences are similar. Berger 
et al. (2005) test the implications of the theoretical models of Flannery (1986) and Diamond 
(1991)
3 . The data cover more than 6,000 individual loans to small businesses granted in 1997 
by a sample of U.S. banks, and the measure of risk is based on bank credit scoring. Their 
results are consistent with the predictions of both Flannery‟s and Diamond‟s models for low-
risk firms. Ceteris paribus, these firms tend to have significantly shorter maturities than other 
firms. For high-risk firms, the evidence conflicts with Flannery‟s and Diamond‟s models and 
                                                 
3 Berger et al. performed two different tests. Test 1 examines whether the effect of risk rating on maturity is 
predicted by Flannery‟s versus Diamond‟s model and test 2 examines the effects of reduced asymmetric 
information on debt maturity   6 
many of the prior empirical studies
4. These firms do not have significantly different maturities 
than intermediate-risk firms.  
Their conclusions shed light on the banks versus market preferences for shortening 
maturity when information asymmetries increase
5. Informational asymmetries which favour 
shorter maturity are smaller for banks than for bondholders and the reactions of ban ks and 
markets to risky debt are not similar. Confronted with a risky firm, the bank would prefer 
rationing the amount of debt to reducing the debt maturity
6. Banks may be better able than 
public  markets  to  use  tools  other  than  short -term  maturities  for  so lving  agency  and 
informational asymmetries problems for high-risk firms. Bank monitoring of high-risk firms 
is associated with long-term loans. Short-term debt contracts are not sophisticated, the typical 
short-term debt contract does not include covenants   which  would  limit  those  managers‟ 
actions harmful to lenders.  
 
The predictions of theoretical models are not easily verifiable  
The  theoretical  literature  deals  with  the  fact  that  firms  with  long-term  projects  often 
decide to borrow on shorter term basis. Long term is debt floated at date 0 that matures at date 
2, with no refinancing at date 1. Short term is debt financed at date 0 that matures at date 1. 
Hence, in some empirical studies, short-term debt can be rather long (less than 20 years for 
one of the first empirical researches, Mitchell, 1991). Even if Barclay and Smith (1995) use a 
slightly more refined measure of debt maturity - less than 3 years -, short-term debt is not 
defined as current debt, i.e. repayable within one year (Appendix A).  
Models  deal  with  the  maturity  of  new  debt  issues  at  the  time  of  origination,  not  the 
remaining time on the stock of contracts (Berger et al., 2005) so the use of maturity structure 
creates  potential  problems.  Predictions  of  some  models  are  not  easily  verifiable  for 
supplementary reasons. For instance, under conditions of asymmetric information, empirical 
studies  of  maturity  must  measure  a  mixture  of  two  effects  –  the  effect  of  information 
asymmetries interacts with risk rating – and in Flannery‟s model, the risk rating is based in 
part on the revelation of private information by firm maturity choice. Because risk rating is 
public, most empirical studies favour public debt. Hence, they mostly consider large firms 
                                                 
4See for instance, Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2006). 
5Bondholders may have public information on the risk of failure that determines the investment -grade rating 
and the rate of interest, banks have private information on the risk of failure that may determine the firm credit 
scoring and the supply conditions (price and quantity), while firms have private information on future prospects 
that does not influence directly the actual risk rating.  
6This is not a case of pure credit rationing, as lenders classify borrowers into groups of distinct quality (Jaffee 
and Stiglitz, 1990).   7 
although it is crucial that the data include small and private firms, in order to test for the 
effects of risk rating and informational asymmetries (Berger et al., 2005). 
We are aware of the potential problems of empirical studies in this field. We use a balance 
sheet approach - the average maturity of outstanding debt – and do not use an incremental 
approach –  the maturity of new debt.  But  we  do not  want  to  test  the predictions of any 
particular theoretical model. We consider that these models share one common hypothesis and 
one prediction that can be tested with a balance sheet approach. They are the twofold:  
i)  short- and long-term debts are substitutes, short-term debt being analysed as a 
subset  of  long-term  debt  issued  for  the  financing  of  long-term  investment  and 
growth opportunities
7.  
ii)  the choice of maturity can reduce costs and create value. Several costs can be 
reduced: the financing cost at the time of debt origination, the expected refinancing 
cost and implicit costs (opportunity, monitoring…).  
These two features shape what will be called in this paper the framework of short-term 
debt analysis in corporate finance. It is the capacity of this framework to explain the observed 
structure of the balance sheet which is at stake in our research.  
 
What do we learn from the credit channel literature? 
The  credit  channel  literature  displays  another  analytical  framework  in  which  banks‟ 
behaviour matters and the short-term debt is analysed as the mode of financing short-term 
assets. According to the bank lending channel, changes in monetary policy affect, via the 
supply of bank loans, especially bank-dependent borrowers who face informational problems 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). In tight money periods, while bank behaviour is pro-cyclical, 
the corporate demand of short-term credit is not. Due to an increase in interest rate and its 
negative  effect  on  interest-sensitive  demand,  inventories  should  be  larger  and  require 
additional cash. Findings from U.S. data show that this reaction is only observed for large 
firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993 and 1994). In the case of large firms, the demand for short-
term bank loans and commercial paper increases in the early stages of downturns to cover the 
increase in current assets, while this is not the case for small firms. The latter do not demand 
additional short-term debt because the amount and timing of the cash flow gap are more 
uncertain, and they face higher informational frictions than their larger counterparts. Using a 
                                                 
7Long and Malitz‟s (1985) consider that firms make short-term borrowing decisions independent of long-term 
investment requirements. Their findings do not corroborate the predictions of Myers‟ model as agency problems 
are not resolved by shortening the debt maturity.   8 
variant of a costly-state verification model, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)
8 demonstrate that “it 
is optimal to impose a kind of credit ceiling which fixes the ratio of debt to output”. Following 
a tight money shock, in the wake of declining cash flows, small firms contract their debt 
demand and inventories, in order to keep the ratio of debt to output in line. In Gertler and 
Gilchrist‟s model, managers choose an optimal rate; short-term debt is independent of long-
term  debt  as  short-term  bank  loans  finance  current  business  and  is  not  an  advantageous 
vehicle in downturns, as it may increase the default risk.  
Our empirical research does not attempt to assess the impact of a tighter monetary policy 
on the firms‟ debt policy. However, a brief presentation of some empirical works on that topic 
highlights the contribution of this theory to the debt maturity issue. Empirical work on the 
existence of a bank lending channel is plagued by an identification problem: does a change in 
bank loans result from a shift in loan demand or a shift in loan supply? In an attempt to limit 
this  identification  problem,  empirical  studies  test  for  a  likely  substitution  effect  among 
sources of short-term debt
9. Kashyap et al. (1993) find that tighter monetary policy leads to a 
shift in firms‟ mix of external financing: firms issue more commercial paper while bank loans 
fall. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) interpret these results differently and show that there is no 
substitution  effect  from  bank  to  non-bank  credit  (commercial  paper  and  trade  credit)  in 
periods of tight money but evidence of a flight to quality phenomenon for all types of credit 
from small to large firms testifying for the broad credit channel. The broad credit channel, or 
balance sheet channel, (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) posits that the external finance premium 
of all forms of debt increases after a monetary contraction. This flight to quality phenomenon 
leads to a shift of credit flows towards the less risky borrowers, i.e. those with high net worth. 
Consequently,  it  mainly  affects  small  firms.  Morgan  (1998)  shows  that  commercial  bank 
loans without a commitment slow after a tight money period, while loans under commitment 
accelerate or remain unchanged. Nilsen (2002) finds that during monetary contractions large 
firms without a bond rating, which account for a large part of overall large firms, and small 
firms increase their use of trade credit, although it is an unattractive alternative to bank loans. 
This switch identifies the cause of the loan reduction as a supply phenomenon, supporting the 
bank lending channel view. Following Nilsen, the “kind of credit ceiling” faced at times of 
                                                 
8Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) provide a theoretical background to their empirical results (Gerther and Gilchrist, 
1993 and 1994). The data drawn from the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations (QFR) 
are not firm-level. In a latter work, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) use newly available firm level QFR 
data. Overall, their results confirm earlier findings that there are substantial cross-sectional differences between 
borrowers  potentially  subject  to  agency  costs  and  those  less  subject  to  agency  costs  (p.  13).  Using  bank-
dependency as a criterion for these costs, they find that the behaviour of bank-dependent firms‟ inventories and 
short-term debt is strongly procyclical.  
9Appendix A displays a list of the substitutes of short-term bank loans.   9 
tight  monetary policy is no longer a target  chosen by small firms  but rather a constraint 
imposed by banks. It is the contraction of banks‟ loan supply that induces a decline in small 
and sometimes large firms‟ bank debt.  
Although, all the studies on the credit channel do not converge, they tend to corroborate 
the core of the credit channel: during tight money periods, either borrowers‟ or investors‟ 
preferences lead to additional short-term credit being allocated to some “happy few”, i.e. large 
firms with a bond rating or loan commitments; as a consequence, short-term credit is counter-
cyclical for these firms, while it is pro-cyclical for the bulk of other firms
10.  
 
The  two  strands  of  the  literature  surveyed  in  this  section  allow to  distin guish  two 
analytical frameworks: i) according to the corporate finance view, the corporate debt maturity 
is a matter of choice, short- and long-term debts being analysed as substitutes which finance 
investment projects, ii) according to the credit channel vi ew, short- and long-term debts are 
distinct vehicles which may be complementary and influenced by banks‟ own characteristics.  
Putting together these two strands of the literature brings two issues up. Firstly, the question is 
raised of a possible substitution or complementary effect between the two sources of debt. 
Secondly, is short-term debt devoted or not to finance current assets? Additional issues are 
raised by the credit channel theory: have banks‟ own characteristics an effect on the observed 
rate of short-term debt during a long period?  
 
III.  The Model 
In order to test which of these two frameworks is most appropriate to explain the variation of 
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10Recently, Bougheas et al. (2006) find that firms‟ characteristics - size and risk - and prevailing monetary 
conditions  are  important  determinants  of  access  to  short-term  credit.  Kashyap  et  al.  (1993),  Oliner  and 
Rudebusch (1996), Morgan (1998) and Nilsen (2002) use U.S. data, while Bougheas et al. (2006) use U.K. data.   10 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variables from the BACH database (Appendix B) 
are disaggregated by country (i), industry (k), firm size (j) and year (t). The other variables are 
drawn from Eurostat and OECD‟s financial accounts databases (Appendix C). 
 
In  this  model,  the  rate  of  short-term  bank  debt  as  a  percentage  of  total  assets 
(ST_BANK_DEBT)  is  explained  by  the  six  following  factors  (see  the  list  of  variables  in 
Appendix C). The two first variables – the rate of long-term bank debt and of current assets – 
are critical to deal with the question raised by the two conflicting analytical frameworks. The 
other explanatory variables are proxies of factors which are expected to have an impact either 
in one analytical framework or in the other.  
 
The long-term debt rate  
As explained in the previous section, following Myers (1977), Flannery (1985) and Diamond 
(1991),  the  debt  maturity  is  determined  by  managers  in  order  to  minimize  the  agency 
problems or to minimize costs in the presence of asymmetric information. Short-term debt 
being  analysed  as  a  substitute  for  long-term  debt,  the  long-term  debt  rate  is  likely  to  be 
endogenous  and  the  expected  sign  of  the  parameter  negative
11. According to the credit 
channel theory, the long-term debt is not a substitute and may be complementary to short-term 
debt, hence the long-term debt rate is expected to have a positive impact
12. The variable 
LT_BANK_DEBT denotes the ratio of long-term bank debt over total assets.  
 
The current assets  
In  most  of  the  corporate  finance  models,  short-term  debt  is  issued  to  finance  long-term 
projects, independently of the assets‟ maturity. Choosing between short- and long-term debts 
according to the asset-liability maturity matching principle conflicts with the models which 
introduce informational asymmetries, but not with the models that explore the role of agency 
problems. Myers (1977) argues that maturity matching can reduce agency conflicts between 
equityholders and debtholders by ensuring that debt repayments are scheduled in accordance 
with the decline in the value of assets in place. In the credit channel literature, short-term debt 
is issued to fund inventory shocks. Although our model is not designed to test the reaction to 
                                                 
11The methodological problem raised by introducing an endogenous variable among the explanatory variables 
is displayed in the next section. 
12Apart from monetary tightenings, the short -  and long-term debts should be analysed as complementary 
resources, both increasing as the amount of fixed and current assets grow with the output. But our model being 
expressed in debt-to-total liabilities or total asset ratios, this complementary effect is lessened.   11 
an inventory shock, finding that changes in the rate of current assets affect the short-term debt 
rate would be congruent with this theory. The selected variable is the level of current assets 
and the expected sign of the parameter is positive. The variable CURRENT_ASSETS denotes 
the ratio of current assets over total assets. 
 
The interest rate spread 
In the models that explore the role of asymmetric information in debt maturity choices, low-
risk firms choose shorter maturities to reduce the financing costs. In line with this theory, 
borrowers‟ choice should be influenced by the current financing costs. Substitution between 
sources of finance should be sensitive to changes in relative prices, firms choosing between 
short- and long-term debts in an effort to time market interest rates, and the preference for 
borrowing on a short-term basis should rise when short rates are lower as compared to long 
ones. When debt maturity structure is used to test this relationship, the short-term debt rate 
should increase along with the spread that measures the term premium. The selected variable 
is the SPREAD - long-term rate minus short-term rate - and the expected sign of the parameter 
is positive. While this strand of the literature predicts a positive influence of the spread, in the 
credit  channel  literature  it  is  controversial.  Proponents  of  the  bank  lending  channel,  for 
example Bernanke and Blinder (1988), assert that firms‟ debt policy can be explained by 
banks‟ lending decisions, independently of the cost of capital. Finding that the spread does not 
play a role would support this expectation.  
 
The risk of default 
In the literature with imperfect information, the choice of corporate debt maturity depends on 
borrowers‟  private  information  about  their  future  credit  rating  and,  in  Diamond‟s  model 
(1991), on the actual credit rating. In this last model, the third risk class – the lower rated 
firms – has less choice than the two others: those firms borrow through banks and bank loans 
are of relatively short term. In our database, the rate of debt issued directly to investors is 
close to zero, and, as a consequence, the rate of short-term debt should increase along with the 
risk of default. To test this relationship, the selected variable is the ratio of financial charges 
to cash flow, commonly used in bank credit scoring as a proxy of the default risk, and denoted 
FC_TO_CF
 13.  
                                                 
13This ratio relates interest paid on financial debts to gross operating profit. In our database, interest paid on 
financial debts includes interest paid on other financial debt (i.e. public debt and debt with group and associated 
companies).   12 
In the credit channel literature, because of the flight-to-quality effect, in the early stages of 
downturns, riskier firms borrowing on a short-term basis would face higher credit constraints 
than other firms. We can infer from banks‟ behaviour during monetary contractions that, even 
in the other stages of the economic cycle, banks do not prefer shorter maturity for riskier firms 
and, if the default risk increases, firms would face higher costs of financing and/or credit 
constraints. Hence, the expected sign of the proxy of the default risk is negative. 
 
The intermediation margin and the overall bank risk management 
In the „corporate finance‟ literature, the rate of corporate short-term debt is analysed as the 
consequence of borrowers‟ choices and explained by demand-side variables. In the credit 
channel literature, the rate of short-term debt clearly depends on banks‟ behaviour. Hence, 
two supply-side variables are introduced in our model as control variables to determine the 
effect of banks‟ policy.  
The first variable tests the likely effect of banks‟ credit strategy. In most European countries, 
the  banking  industry  has  been  shifting  away  from  its  traditional  activity  of  loan  making 
toward new activities linked with financial markets. The reliance on interest-based income – 
called  the  intermediation  margin
14  –  decreases,  while  new  activities  generate  fee-based 
revenues. During the last decades, as European banks have become relatively less involved in 
loan activities, firms may have faced higher credit constraints. Such credit constraints would 
not be due to monetary policy but to banks‟ strategy. If this hypothesis is validated, then the 
intermediation margin should contribute to explain the rate of corporate short-term bank debt. 
A significant and positive value of the parameter would indicate the determinant role of this 
supply factor in explaining the rate of short-term corporate debt. The variable is denoted 
INTERM_MARGIN. 
Banks constraints also affect the credit policy  and borrowers‟ behaviour, in line with the 
credit  channel  literature
15.  The  implementation  of  the  Basle  regulation  has  imposed  a 
minimum equity requirement on banks. As a second supply -side variable, we introduce the 
ratio of equity to bank loans that can be considered as an implicit Cooke ratio and a proxy of 
bank solvability. A higher ratio means that the level of equity is less binding and banks are 
more ready to increase their loan supply. So we expect a positive relationship. This ratio is 
denoted BANK_SOLV. 
                                                 
14This ratio relates the net interest income to the net banking income. This variable has two components: net 
interest income and non-interest income.  
15A growing subset of the credit channel literature emphasizes bank capital as a relevant constraint.    13 
 
Dummy variables 
The model also includes dummy variables as they may pick up an influence that is not already 
captured by our other explanatory variables. We include four types of dummy variables in 
order to take into account the size, the country, the industry sector and the year. 
 
Summary of empirical predictions 
If short-term debt is used in order to solve agency or informational problems, then a negative 
impact of long-term debt ratio is expected while the spread and the ratio of financial charges 
to cash flow are supposed to have a positive effect on the demand of short-term bank debt. In 
accordance with the credit channel theory, short-term debt should increase as the level of 
current  assets  increases  and  the  two  variables  that  characterize  banks‟  activity  –  the 
intermediation margin ratio and the proxy for bank solvability – should have a positive effect 
on corporate short-term debt. Table 4 (infra) summarizes these predictions. 
 
 
IV.   Data Presentation 
 
The data 
The data used to test our model come from three sources. The source of firm data is the 
BACH database which provides comparable data on the annual accounts of non-financial 
companies in European countries, broken down by major activity sector and by size (see 
Appendix B) 
16. Accounts are  harmonized through a common layout based on the Fourth 
Council Directive of 1978. All the variables are expressed as a percentage of the total balance 
sheet. Having selected countries for which all observations of our variables were available, 
our sample includes six countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain), three 
sizes  and  six industries (manufacturing;  electricity,  gas  and  water supply;  construction; 
wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communica tion)
17. 
                                                 
16The BACH database is the result of a co-operation between the European Commission and the European 
Committee of Central Balance-sheet data offices. The coverage of the sample firms of the BACH database is 
assessed by Cobham (2004), it is exhaustive for Belgium. BACH also includes U.S. and Japan data, but their 
comparability with European data is more limited. 
17Small Austrian firms are excluded from our sample because of the poor quality of the data.   14 
Our empirical study covers the period 1989 through 2003 
18 and our “firm” database has 
1,285 observations. 
Most of the firm-level databases that cover several countries are limited to listed firms. 
Panel data such as Compustat typically restrict attention to publicly listed firms, and therefore 
under-represent small firms. This is not the case of the BACH database as basic data are 
collected from official national institutions with a department akin to a central balance-sheet 
data office in order to provide a reasonably good coverage rate, notably for small firms. The 
database  does  not  provide  individual  data  but  semi-aggregated  data.  The  use  of  semi-
aggregated data instead of individual data has its advantages and disadvantages. It induces a 
loss of information but an improvement in the data quality. It is more congruent with the use 
in our model of aggregated data to characterize the credit supply. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays the lower and higher values of the short-term bank debt rate at the beginning 
and the end of the period.  
 
TABLE 1 
Short-term debt rate by firm size 
  1989    2003 
  lower rate  
(country) 
higher rate    lower rate  higher rate 
























Notes:  The  table  displays  the  lower  and  the  higher  value  of  the  short-term  debt  rate  for 
manufacturing firms by size in 1989 and 2003, respectively the beginning and the end of the period 
under review. The country in which these lower and higher values are observed is in brackets. Data are 
from the BACH database. All values are expressed as a percentage of total assets. 
 
In 2003, the end of the period under review, using the BACH database, for manufacturing 
firms, the lowest rate of short-term bank debt over total assets was observed for the large 
Spanish firms (1.1%), while the highest rate was reached by the Italian small firms (18.1%)
19. 
                                                 
18In the case of medium-sized Austrian firms and large Belgian firms, the number of years for which data are 
available is smaller, with respectively 11 and 9 years. 
19In the BACH database, ratios are computed with semi-aggregated items hence they are ratios of average and 
not averaged ratios. As a consequence, descriptive statistics have to be calculated by size, industry and country; 
for this reason, only data from manufacturing firms are reported in Table 1 and Appendices D and E.    15 
Mean values for the overall period, in the case of manufacturing firms, rank from 2.8% for the 
large German firms to 19.1% for the small Italian firms (Appendix D).  
The statistical analysis of our sample is displayed in Appendix D (Tables D1 and D2 display 
statistics  of  BACH  variables  and  Table  D3  displays  statistics  on  aggregated  variables). 
Descriptive elements are given in the following paragraphs. They are limited to the case of the 
manufacturing firms. 
Small and medium-sized firms(SMEs) rely more than their larger counterparts on short-
term debt but, as this hierarchy is also observed with long-term debt (Appendix E), the ratio 
short-term debt over long-term debt is higher for SMEs than for large ones in only three 
countries. The level of current assets is high, especially for SMEs. Whatever the size and the 
country, the standard deviation of this variable is low, while the standard deviation of the 
variable financial charges to cash flow is high.  
The ratio of short-term bank debt has declined during the period under review, but in the 
case of the Italian SMEs. At the beginning of the period, in all the countries, the spread was 
negative or close to zero. This relatively infrequent negative sign was the consequence of the 
monetary policy which aimed at reducing the rate of inflation as a condition for preparing the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). In the 2000s, the spread has become positive and displays 
similar values of around 2% in all the countries as they are members of the EMU. In all the 
sample countries except Germany, the intermediation margin as a percentage of net banking 
income (NBI) has decreased during the selected period. In France, interest-based revenues 
which reached 80% of NBI in 1990 are no longer the main source of banking income. In the 
other countries, the decline is noticeable even if not so dramatic. The ratio that relates the 
bank  capital  and  reserves  to  bank  loans,  and  assesses  the  bank  solvability,  has  increased 
during the period under review in all the countries but Spain.  
 
 
V.  Estimation methods and results 
 
Methodological issues 
We address a classical econometric problem. The estimators of the regression coefficients can 
have omitted variable bias. Recall that, in the BACH database, observational unit or entity has 
three dimensions (country, industry, size) and is observed at several years. In our regressions, 
the  introduction  of  dummy  variables  allows  us  to  control  for  omitted  variables  that  are   16 
constant  over  three  of  the  four  dimensions.  At  this  first  step,  the  estimated  model  is  a 
regression  model  written  in  terms  of  an  intercept  and  four  sets  of  binary  variables  or 
dummies
20. The least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator yields the within or fixed 
effect estimator for β
21. 
We address  a second econometric problem. Recall that, in accordance with the corporate 
finance analytical framework, firms are expected to co-determine their ratios of short- and 
long-term debts, so the long-term debt rate is likely to be endogenous. In accordance with the 
credit channel analytical framework, the rate of current assets is expected to be sensitive to a 
monetary  policy  change.  It  follows  that  these  two  explanatory  variables  are  expected  to 
correlate with the error term εi,j,k,t. If so, estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not 
consistent for the regressors of these variables but this problem can be solved by introducing 
instrumental  variables  (IV)  that  allow  for  estimating  the  parameters  of  the  endogenous 
regressors
22. In order to be valid, IV must not be correlated with the error term and must be 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. The instruments in the estimation of our 
model are lagged variables, which are commonly used as IV as they plausibly satisfy the two 
conditions of validity.  
However, this choice triggers a third econometric problem. We know that the LSDV 
estimator of  β turns out to equal the within or fixed effects estimator. This last estimator 
measures the association between individual-specific deviations of regressors from their time-
averaged values and individual-specific deviations of the dependent variable from its time-
averaged value. As a consequence, lagged IV would also correlate with the error term and the 
IV estimator would not be consistent. The number of years being not large, the model has to 
be estimated in another way. We control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors and 
solve this third problem by using a first difference GMM approach. 
The equation to be estimated, in matrix notation, takes the general following form: 
) ( ) ( 1 , , , , , , 1 , , , , , , 1 , , , , , , t k j i t k j i t t k j i t k j i t k j i t k j i z x x y y , 
where y denotes the dependent variable, x the vector of explanatory variables and z the vector 
of dummy variables. 
                                                 
20For a given set of dummies, we must drop one binary variable to avoid the well known dummy variable trap, 
otherwise one of the regressors would be a perfect linear combination of the other regressors. This is the reason 
why the summation for each set of dummy variables runs up to n-1. 
21 This is a special case of the so-called Frisch-Waugh theorem. 
22As we use an IV method, the parameters are Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates obtained as follows: 
in a first step, we regress the endogenous variable on all exogenous variables by  OLS; in a second step, we 
estimate by a Least Squares method the parameters of the regression after replacing the endogenous variable by 
the estimate from the first step.   17 
 
Estimation Results 
Firstly,  regressions  are  performed  on  the  original  dataset,  observations  having  four 
dimensions (size, industry, country, time). Table 2 reports the relationship between the rate of 
short-term  bank  debt  and  their  explanatory  variables  for  firms  in  the  original  dataset. 
Regression is run with all the variables of the model (column 1), then insignificant variables 
are dropped (columns 2 and 3). Seven lagged variables of one, two or three periods are used 
as instruments. Their validity can be tested through a Sargan test of overidentification which 
measures whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error term
23. The Sargan statistic 
(0.58) is much lower than the critical value of  a χ
2 distribution with 5 degrees of freedom 
(11.07). To be valid, an instrument also has to be relevant
24. Two methods are used to check 
the relevance. Correlation with the endogenous regressors is assessed by an examination of 
the significance of the  excluded instruments in the first-stage regression. We report the p -
value of the overall F-statistic from the first-stage regression. The low values indicate that the 
models of the first-stage regression are always significant.  
The 2SLS estimates yield two similar results: the rate of long-term bank debt and the rate 
of current assets have always a positive and highly significant impact on the rate of short-term 
bank debt. There is no evidence of a substitution effect between short - and long-term debts. 
Our results are in line with the credit channel literature which posits that short -term debt 
increases along with the current assets and that long -term debt may be a complementary 
resource. The OLS estimates yield quite distinct results. Large differences betwee n OLS and 
2SLS estimates can be interpreted as evidence of endogeneity. 
Secondly, in order to test the robustness of our results, the original dataset is reconfigured 
as a classical panel structure, observations only having two dimensions (i,t) (i aggregates three 
of the four dimensions, i.e. size, industry  and  country). Using a first-difference  approach 
allows to control firm-specific and time-invariant effects, and the possible endogeneity of the 
regressors. Table 3 reports the relationship between the rate of short-term bank debt and their 
explanatory variables for firms in the panel dataset. The same tests are used to know if the 
instruments are both valid and relevant. The Sargan test for overidentifying restriction has a p-
                                                 
23The Sargan test is a specification test used to assess the validity of instruments included in models estimated 
by  instrumental  variables  (IV),  as  the  instruments  must  not  correlate  with  the  error  term.  The  model  is 
overidentified with seven instruments and two likely endogenous variables. Degrees of freedom are equal to the 
number of instruments less the number of endogenous variables. 
24 There is no well established formal test of weak instruments, especially in the case of multiple regressors with 
more than one endogenous variable (Baum et al., 2003).   18 
value much higher than 0.05. The p-values of the overall F-statistic validate the first-stage 
regression models.  
 
TABLE 2 
First-differences GMM-IV estimator, original dataset with four dimensions (i,j,k,t) 
  1    2    3 
  OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 












                 












                 












                 




           
                 




           
                 























                 
Sargan    0.58 
χ
2 (5)0.05 = 
11.07 
    0.58 
χ
2 (5)0.05 = 
11.07 




p-values of the F-
statistic 
               
LT_BANK_DEBT    <0.0001      <0.0001      <0.0001 
CURRENT_ASSETS    0.0002      <0.0001      <0.0001 
The dependent variable is the short-term debt rate. The table reports the OLS and 2SLS estimates of regressors in 
first-difference estimator (proc model under SAS). The variables LT_BANK_DEBT and CURRENT_ASSETS are 
endogenous.  Instruments  include  the  following  variables  in  first-difference:  LT_BANK_DEBTi,t-3, 
LT_BANK_DEBTi,t-4,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-2,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-3,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-4,  SPREADi,t-1, 
SPREADi,t-2,  SPREADi,t-3,  exogenous  variables  and  country,  industry,  size  and  time  dummies.  Estimates  of 
country, industry, size and time dummies are not reported. Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents regression results with all the explanatory variables which is 
not the case of the remaining columns. Results are qualitatively the same for the two variables 
of interest than previous results reported in Table 2. The ratios of current assets and of long-
term bank debt contribute significantly to the explanation of short-term debt, with a positive   19 





First-differences GMM-IV estimator, panel data (i,t) 
  1  2  3  4 








         








         




  -0.043 
(0.138) 
         
FC_TO_CF  0.001 
(0.003) 
     
         




   
         















Number of groups  90  90  90  90 
Sargan  1.83 
χ
2 (5)0.05 = 11.07 
1.83 
χ
2 (5)0.05 = 11.07 
1.56 
χ
2 (3)0.05 = 7.81 
2.91 
χ
2 (5)0.05 = 11.07 
p-values of the F-statistic         
LT_BANK_DEBT  0.0089  0.0079  0.0025  0.0089 
CURRENT_ASSETS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
The dependent variable is the short-term debt rate. All specifications are estimated using the Andersen-Hsiao 
first-difference estimator (xtivreg under Stata). The variables LT_BANK_DEBT and CURRENT_ASSETS are 
endogenous.  Instruments  include  the  following  variables  in  first-difference:  LT_BANK_DEBTi,t-2, 
LT_BANK_DEBTi,t-3,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-1,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-2,  CURRENT_ASSETSi,t-3,  SPREADi,t-2, 
SPREADi,t-3, exogenous variables and time dummies. Estimates of time dummies are not reported. Standard 
errors are in brackets. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
The  proxy  of  the  risk  of  default,  i.e.  the  ratio  of  financial  charges  to  cash  flow 
(FC_TO_CF), is never significant. For the other explanatory variables, results from the two 
estimation  techniques,  reported  in  Tables  2  and  3  respectively,  are  not  similar.  Firms‟ 
behaviour is influenced by the current financing costs – the interest rate spread – but this 
                                                 
25 The model was also estimated on the original dataset and level observations, these two variables were 
significant with a positive coefficient.   20 
result is only obtained with the original dataset and is not robust
26. Supply variables have been 
introduced as control variables to capture the likely effect of banks‟ lending decisions. As 
indicated in Tables 2 and 3, the estimated coefficients of the two variables of interest are not 
modified when the supply variables are dropped. When the model is tested on the original 
dataset, supply variables are never significant. When it is tested on panel data, results reported 
in Table 3 show that the variable used as a proxy for bank‟s solvability (BANK_SOLV) has, as 
expected, a highly significant and positive effect while the coefficient of the interest rate 
spread  (SPREAD)  is  never  significant.  These  last  results  deserve  interest.  We  expect  the 
sensitivity of short-term bank debt use to differ with the size, smaller firms facing higher 
informational  problems  than  larger  ones.  Although  the  effect  of  informational  problems 
cannot be directly observed, it was controlled by using size dummies in the regressions run 
with the original data set (Table 2). In the regressions performed on panel data, the size effect, 
along  with  the  industry  and  the  country,  is  no  more  controlled  by  dummies  and  is  not 
controlled by the estimation method when this effect is time-varying. The positive impact of 
bank solvability becomes significant and this supply variable dominates the impact of relative 
prices which ceases to be significant with the new specifications. 
 
TABLE 4 
Predictions and empirical results 
Rate of short-term bank debt  Corporate finance theory  Credit channel theory   Empirical results 
Rate of long-term bank debt  -  +  + 
Rate of current assets   n. i.  +  + 
Interest spread   +  + or n. i.  + or n. s. 
Risk of default   +  -  n. s. 
Intermediation margin  n. i.  +  n. s. 
Bank solvability  n. i.  +  + or n. s. 
n. i.: no impact. 
 
To sum up, our most important empirical results are the following: the corporate short-
term debt ratio is sensitive to current business and is not a substitute to the long-term debt 
ratio,  in  accordance  with  the  credit  channel  theory.  They  do  not  validate  the  analytical 
framework  of  the  corporate  finance  theory  which  assumes  that  when  funding  investment 
projects, corporate managers choose between these two financial resources, as if they were 
substitutes. Table 4 summarizes predictions and results. 
 
                                                 
26 When the variable indicating banks solvability is dropped, the variable spread becomes insignificant (Table 2, 
column 3).   21 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper we aim to confront two distinct analytical frameworks – the corporate finance 
theory and the monetary policy transmission literature – to investigate the short-term bank 
debt determinants. 
We estimate a model that explains the short-term debt rate, measured as the rate of short-
term bank loans as a percentage of total assets, using semi-aggregated data from the BACH 
database of corporate accounts for six Continental European countries in the period 1989-
2003. We first estimate our model using a GMM estimator in first-differences on the original 
four-dimension  dataset  and  then  on  classical  panel  data.  In  our  model,  two  explanatory 
variables are critical: the long-term bank debt and current assets. In the corporate finance 
theory short-term and long-term debts would be substitutes, short-term debt being a vehicle 
able to finance any kind of assets. The credit view considers short- and long-term debts as 
distinct vehicles that may be complementary, and the former should be devoted to finance 
current assets. Hence long-term bank debt and current assets are likely to be endogenous.  
Our findings lead to the conclusion that short-term bank debt should be better analysed as 
a specific vehicle that finances current assets, especially inventories, as is the case in the 
literature on monetary policy transmission than as a target chosen by managers who minimise 
explicit  costs  and/or  agency  and  information  costs.  Yet,  the  corporate  finance  theory 
predictions  cannot  be  easily  tested.  Indeed,  short-  and  long-term  are  subjective  concepts, 
short-term debt is analysed as a subset of long-term debt and the duration of the loan is left 
undefined,  while  in  our  study  short-term  debt  is  empirically  defined  as  bank  debt  with 
maturity under one year. 
 
   22 
  
Appendix A: what does short-term mean? 
 
Short-term credit includes the following three items: 
(i) loan commitments and lines of credits granted by commercial banks to borrowers; it is one 
of the primary sources of short-term financing for small businesses;  
(ii)  commercial  paper  is  the  only  publicly  traded  short-term  debt.  It  is  used  by  large 
corporations and mostly by financial companies;  
(iii) trade credit is a non-financial source of short-term credit, provided by suppliers. It is an 
important source of short-term financing at the individual firm level. 
The maturity of short-term debt depends on the instrument. The maturity of commercial 
paper is often lower than one month, although it can be extended to nine months. Bank loans 
under one year are short term.  
Definitions of the meaning of short-term are subjective. 
- In the empirical literature, corporate short-term debt is often public and, hence, does not 
include bank debt, while it may include public bonds with maturity under five years. 
- In the case of European firms, credit granted by banks is by far the major source of financial 
debt. In our empirical research, corporate short-term debt is limited to bank debt and debt with 
maturity  under  one  year  is  labelled  short-term.  Should  our  study  focus  on  public  debt 
including bonds with maturity under five years, then we can assume that our results would be 
different. But this focus would be of little interest in the case of continental European non-
financial firms as public debt is a very limited source of financing. 
- The empirical question of the debt maturity is outside the realm of theoretical models. In the 
theoretical literature, debt maturity is associated with the issue of the length of the relationship 
between the borrower and the lender. Short term means one period, long term two or more 
periods.  In  these  models,  the  advantage  of  one  loan  (one  period)  is  compared  with  the 
advantage of a series of tacitly renewable loans (two or more periods).  
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Appendix B: presentation of the BACH database 
Bank  for  the  Accounts  of  Companies  Harmonised  (BACH)  is  a  database  set  up  in  1987 
containing harmonised annual accounts statistics of non-financial enterprises for 11 European 
countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden),  Japan  and  the  United  States.  The  present  analysis  takes  into 
account 6 countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The other countries 
have been excluded for different reasons: Finland, Sweden and Denmark owing to missing 
data, the Netherlands owing to consolidated data, Portugal owing to the lack of data broken 
down according to the common size criterion between 1991 and 1995, the United States and 
Japan because the degree of data harmonization is still low.  
Size 
A distinction is made between three categories of firms:  
- Size 1: Small firms with a turnover of less than 10 million Euros; 
- Size 2: Medium-sized companies with a turnover between 10 million and 50 million Euros; 
- Size 3: Large companies with a turnover in excess of 50 million Euros.  
Industry sectors  
Data have been grouped together according to NACE classification. The sectors included in 
our sample are the following: Sector D = Manufacturing industry; Sector E = Electricity, gas 
and water supply; Sector F = Construction. Sector G = Wholesale and retail trade; Sector H = 
Hotels and restaurants  
Accounting data  
The BACH accounting layout comprises a balance sheet and a profit and loss account. Assets 
and liabilities are given as a percentage of the total balance sheet. Profit and loss account 
items and statements of investment and depreciation are presented as a percentage of the 
turnover. In addition, the total balance sheet, the value added and the turnover are given in 
national currency units. The financial statements are not consolidated for the six selected 
countries. 
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Appendix C: list and definition of the variables used 
 
Variables drawn from the BACH database 
 
The BACH measurement of balance sheet variables is made on a book-value basis. 
 
ST_BANK_DEBT 
The dependent variable is the rate of short-term bank debt as a percentage of total assets. 
Short-term  bank  debt  corresponds  to  the  category  of  debt  “owed  to  credit  institutions 
becoming due and payable within one year” which includes long-term debt maturing within 
one year, except for French firms.  
 
LT_BANK_DEBT 
The rate of long-term bank debt as a percentage of total assets. 
 
These two ratios do not cover all financial debt as they do not include commercial paper and 
bonds issued on financial market, both being a very limited source of funding non-financial 




The rate of current assets as a percentage of total assets. Current assets are either cash or 
assets that could be converted into cash within one year. This category includes cash and 
other marketable securities, accounts receivable and inventories. 
 
Variable drawn from Eurostat database 
 
SPREAD  
The long-term debt rate of interest less the short-term debt rate of interest. This variable is 
calculated as the difference between two time series, the 10 years Treasury bond interest rate 
and the three-month rate.  
 
Variables drawn from OECD’s financial account database   25 
 
These bank data are aggregated at the country level. 
 
INTERM_MARGIN  
The rate of net interest-based income as a percentage of total net banking income. 
 
BANK_SOLV  
A proxy of banks solvability, measured by the rate of equity as a percentage of total loans. 
   26 
Appendix D: Descriptive statistics 
TABLE D1 
Summary statistics of BACH variables, manufacturing firms 
Size class  Observations  Variable  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Austria 


































































































































































Notes:  The  table  presents  the  Min,  Max,  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  dependent  and  independent 
variables for French firms and large Austrian firms for the period 1989-2003; for medium-sized Austrian firms 
for the period 1990-2003; for Belgian firms for the period 1993- or 1995-2003. Min, Max and mean values are 
expressed as a percentage of total assets. Data are for manufacturing firms and from the BACH database. The 
variables  are  defined  as  follows.  ST_BANK_DEBT  is  the  ratio  of  short-term  bank  debt  to  total  assets; 
LT_BANK_DEBT is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total assets; CURRENT_ASSETS is the ratio of current 
assets to total assets, and FC_TO_CF is the ratio of financial charges to cash flow.   27 
TABLE D2 
Summary statistics of BACH variables, manufacturing firms 
Size class  Observations  Variable  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Germany 






















































































































































































Notes: The table presents the Min, Max, mean and standard deviation of dependent and independent 
variables for German, Italian and Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1989-2003. Min, Max and 
mean  values  are  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  total  assets.  Data  are  from  the  BACH  database.  The 
variables are defined as follows. ST_BANK_DEBT is the ratio of short-term bank debt to total assets; 
LT_BANK_DEBT is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total assets; CURRENT_ASSETS is the ratio of 
current assets to total assets, and FC_TO_CF is the ratio of financial charges to cash flow.   28 
 
TABLE D3 
Summary statistics of aggregate variables 
Variable  Observations  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Austria 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  49.84  72.15  60.03  8.99 
BANK_SOLV  15  8.51  10.50  9.38  0.56 
SPREAD  15  -1.15  2.98  1.11  1.24 
Belgium 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  49.51  81.58  66.99  10.27 
BANK_SOLV  15  7.62  11.35  9.36  1.26 
SPREAD  15  -0.84  3.31  1.22  1.25 
France 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  36.93  79.98  54.65  14.42 
BANK_SOLV  15  7.84  13.56  11.22  1.71 
SPREAD  15  -1.79  2.38  0.72  1.34 
Germany 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  64.15  80.773  72.95  5.67 
BANK_SOLV  15  6.83  9.373  7.84  0.80 
SPREAD  15  -1.61  2.95  0.96  1.28 
Italy 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  63.15  83.03  73.35  6.12 
BANK_SOLV  15  12.65  16.80  15.22  1.20 
SPREAD  15  -0.74  2.15  1.07  0.86 
Spain 
INTERM_MARGIN  15  64.24  82.40  74.06  5.70 
BANK_SOLV  15  15.09  22.04  18.58  2.36 
SPREAD  15  -1.65  1.99  0.63  1.33 
Notes: The table presents the Min, Max, mean and standard deviation of independent variables for 
the  six  selected  European  countries  for  the  period  1989-2003.  INTERM_MARGIN  denotes  the 
intermediation  margin  measured as net interest income on net banking income;  BANK_SOLV is a 
proxy for banks‟ profitability that corresponds to banks‟ equity on bank loans, and the SPREAD is the 
difference between the 10 years Treasury bond interest rate and the three-month interest rate. The 
variables  INTERM_MARGIN  and  BANK_SOLV  are  from  OECD‟s  financial  account  database;  the 
variable SPREAD is from Eurostat database. Min, Max and mean values of the two first variables are 
expressed as a percentage.   29 




Long-term debt rate by firm size 
  1989    2003 
  lower rate  
(country) 
higher rate    lower rate  higher rate 












  5.9 % 
(Belgium) 
10.6 %  
(Austria) 








Notes:  The  table  displays  the  lower  and  the  higher  value  of  the  long-term  debt  rate  for 
manufacturing firms by size in 1989 and 2003, respectively the beginning and the end of the 
period  under  review.  The  country  in  which  these  lower  and  higher  values  are  observed  is  in 
brackets. Data are from the BACH database. All values are expressed as a percentage of total 
assets.   30 
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